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James Wells' Anti-Naturalness Quackery

Sabine Hossenfelder celebrates a preprint titled
Naturalness, Extra-Empirical Theory Assessments, too the Implications of Skepticism
and rightfully thence because its author, James Wells, could literally milkshake her manus right away too bring together her personal displace of crackpots. Wells' newspaper isn't just incorrect – it's incredibly stupid. Thankfully, he exclusively sent it to the "History too Philosophy of Physics" subarchive although it was cross-listed to the professional person subarchives. (Maybe the arXiv moderators should live thanked for correctly classifying this newspaper as social sciences, pseudosciences, too humanities.)




OK, Wells (like Hossenfelder) wants to eliminate naturalness – too whatever "extra-empirical quality" – from science. Do you lot genuinely retrieve it's possible? Not really. Let us verbalize over the abstract carefully.
Naturalness is an extra-empirical character that aims to assess plausibility of a theory.
It's a proposed Definition or classification too it's fair enough.




Now,
Finetuning measures are ane way to quantify the task.
Very well. Everyone knows that. The next judgement says:
However, knowing statistical distributions on parameters appears necessary for rigor.
Yup. If you lot desire to exactly (it's a ameliorate intelligence than "rigorously") calculate a fine-tuning mensurate or roughly other quantity telling you lot how much a theory is fine-tuned, you lot demand statistical distributions on the infinite of possible theories too on their parameter spaces.
Such meta-theories are non known yet.
Strictly speaking, it may live truthful because there's no precise or rigorous prescription to calculate the probability of roughly values of parameters or the probability of ane theory consistent alongside observations or another.

However, what Wells completely misses is that some i.e. not precise too non rigorous prescription to compare ii theories has to live used, anyway, otherwise the scientific method as a whole would live impossible. Without this type of – imprecise or non rigorous – thinking, nosotros couldn't say whether development or creationism is a ameliorate theory of the source of species. We wouldn't live able to say anything.

Again, I must quote Feynman's monologue nearly the flight saucers. All the statements that scientific discipline produces are of the shape that ane declaration is to a greater extent than probable too roughly other ane is less probable etc. All such probabilities e'er depend on the priors, non exclusively on the evidence. It's unavoidable. If you lot ban sentences that "flying saucers are unlikely" (because you lot regain the dependence on the prior probabilities "unscientific"), too Feynman's antagonist wanted to ban them, thence you lot are banning scientific discipline as a whole.

So it's non truthful that such meta-theories are non known yet. They are known, they are imprecise too non rigorous, but they are absolutely essential for scientific discipline too successful, too.
A critical give-and-take of these issues is presented, including their possible resolutions inward fixed points.
He includes a technical give-and-take of fixed points (scaling-invariant patch theories) but claims that all "extra-empirical reasoning" is unacceptable inward their context, too.
Skepticism of naturalness's utility remains credible, as is skepticism to whatever extra-empirical theory assessment (SEETA) that claims to position "more correct" theories that are as empirically adequate.
This skepticism is as credible as creationism too all other incorrect approaches to scientific discipline – inward fact, this skepticism is a key part of them. Otherwise, it's groovy that he invented a novel acronym. Brain-dead journalists volition sure enough boast nearly their mightiness to re-create too hype this novel meaningless acronym.

Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 crucial proposal for "a novel sort of science" appears here:
Specifically to naturalness, SEETA implies that ane must convey all concordant theory points as a priori as plausible, alongside the practical implication that a theory tin never receive got its plausibility condition diminished past times fifty-fifty a "massive reduction" of its feasible parameter infinite as long as a unmarried theory dot withal survives.
Wow. You know, maxim that all theories are "equally possible" way that they receive got the same probability, namely \(p\). But a occupation is that they're mutually exclusive too at that topographic point are infinitely many of them. It follows that\[

\sum_{i=1}^\infty p \leq 1.

\] Their total probability is at most equal to one. I chose the \(\leq\) sign to emphasize that we're exclusively summing over the known theories too at that topographic point may live additional ones that receive got a take away a opportunity to live correct. But the left manus side inward a higher house is equal to \(p\cdot \infty\) too the exclusively allowed value of \(p\) that obeys the inequality inward a higher house is \(p=0\). If all theories inward an infinite listing were as plausible, thence all of them would live strictly ruled out, too!

In reality, the theories are also parameterized past times continuous parameters thence the nub inward a higher house should live replaced or supplemented alongside an integral. With an integral, the declaration that they are "equally plausible" becomes ill-defined because, as Wells admitted, he doesn't receive got whatever measure. He wants to exercise the absence of a canonical mensurate as a "weapon against others" but overlooks that it's a weapon against his ain claims, too.

If he forbids you lot to exercise whatever measure, thence his declaration that ii points (or regions) at a continuous parameter infinite are "equally plausible" becomes nonsensical.
A 2d implication of SEETA suggests that exclusively falsifiable theories allow their plausibility condition to change, but exclusively after regain or after zero experiments alongside total theory coverage.
Excellent. If this dominion is interpreted literally, you lot genuinely can't eliminate creationism or whatever incorrect theory. In those 7 days He had to create all the species, He could receive got used tools alongside a sufficient number of parameters thence that He created the right deoxyribonucleic acid of all the species nosotros need. If you lot can't exclude "all creationist models" too every unmarried ane of them, you lot can't genuinely say that creationism is really unlikely, Wells (just similar Feynman's antagonist) tells us.

Many of us say that development is a far ameliorate theory of the source of species than creationism. Why? Because the fine-tuning that creationism needs to concur alongside the observed details is massive. And when the required fine-tuning is massive, it just doesn't genuinely affair what's the "precise" or "rigorous" way to quantify it. Any sensible way to quantify it volition withal conclude that it is massive. Now, the intelligence "sensible" inward the previous judgement also fails to live defined precisely. But at roughly moment, you lot receive got to halt alongside these complaints, otherwise you lot just can't larn anywhere inward science.

That's why Wells' claim that you lot should completely abandon naturalness too "extra-empirical criteria" just because they're non perfectly precise is thence unbelievably idiotic. You could attempt to apply his fundamentalist mental attitude inward whatever other context. Child porn cannot live exactly defined, either. Does it hateful that nosotros can't ban it? Well, Justice Potter Stewart defined porn past times maxim that "I know it when I encounter it".

That's genuinely the dot inward the give-and-take of naturalness, too. There may live roughly marginal cases inward which the absence of a precise Definition or quantification volition drib dead far impossible to reliably create upward one's hear whether something is porn or whether something is natural. But inward a huge fraction of the cases that are relevant for police pull enforcement officials too for physicists, the quantities labeling the "amount of porn" or the "naturalness" goal upward existence thence far from the "disputable lines" that the imprecision won't affair at all. In thence many cases, nosotros volition say: "This is porn." We volition say it fifty-fifty without a rigorous Definition of "porn". And inward the same way, nosotros volition say that a creationist model explaining roughly deoxyribonucleic acid sequences is "unnatural" fifty-fifty though nosotros don't genuinely receive got a canonical, unique, universal, ultimate, precise Definition of "naturalness of a hypothesis nearly the source of species", either!

So when roughly theories are genuinely heavily unnatural, nosotros just encounter it. And nosotros demand this judgment, despite its lack of rigor too precision, to practice science. We receive got e'er needed it. We couldn't create upward one's hear fifty-fifty nearly the basic questions if nosotros banned this "extra-empirical" reasoning. Everyone who questions the demand for this imprecise or "extra-empirical" reasoning is absolutely deluded.

Sometimes the implausibility of a theory – similar creationism – is understood informally, intuitively, too qualitatively. Sometimes, peculiarly inward commutation physics, nosotros demand a fleck to a greater extent than quantitative treatment. This handling is non rigorous or precise but it's to a greater extent than quantitative than the arguments nosotros demand to criticize creationism. So nosotros assume that the distributions are roughly natural uniform distributions by too large spanning the values of dimensionless parameters that are of club one. The detailed choice doesn't genuinely affair when something is genuinely unnatural! In most cases, nosotros receive got pretty adept arguments to say that the choice of a uniform distribution for \(g\) or \(g^2\) or \(1/g^2\) is to a greater extent than natural than the other ii etc.

The lastly judgement of the abstract is really cute, too:
And a tertiary implication of SEETA is that theory preference thence becomes non nearly what theory is to a greater extent than right but what theory is practically to a greater extent than advantageous, such as fewer parameters, easier to calculate, or has novel experimental signatures to pursue.
The exclusively occupation is that a genuine scientist, pretty much past times definition, looks for the more right or to a greater extent than probable theories. He wants to response the questions such as whether creationism or development is a ameliorate theory of the source of species, whether a proton is composed of smaller particles, whether at that topographic point is a Higgs boson, too millions of other things.

So the correctness or probability of different possibilities just has to live compared, otherwise you're non doing scientific discipline at all. You're non producing whatever scientific results, whatever laws, nothing. By promoting SEETA, Wells pretends to live "more scientific" but inward reality, he wants to throw the key babe of the scientific method out alongside the bathroom water.

Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 existent scientist is working to regain the truth nearly Nature – which way the (more) right too (more) probable theories that explicate our observations. If he's looking for a theory that is "practically to a greater extent than advantageous, such as fewer parameters, easier to calculate, or has novel experimental signatures to pursue", thence he is just non a scientist inward the proper sense. He's a utilitarian of a sort.

Theory Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 may live simpler to calculate alongside than theory B. But that doesn't hateful that it's to a greater extent than right or to a greater extent than probable to live true.

At the starting fourth dimension of the abstract, Wells declared his goal to loose scientific discipline from all the distributions too "extra-empirical" judgments. But inward the lastly sentence, he contradicts himself too basically admits it's impossible. So he also has roughly "extra-empirical" criteria, after all. The exclusively divergence is that his criteria aren't designed to expect for to a greater extent than probable theories. He's looking for to a greater extent than convenient (and similar adjectives that are non equivalent to the truth) ideas.

There is an overlap betwixt his criteria too the criteria of physicists who are genuinely looking for the truth nearly Nature. For example, both seem to prefer "theories alongside a modest number of parameters". But Wells exclusively picks this criterion because of roughly convenience. In proper physics, nosotros may genuinely justify why nosotros get down alongside a theory alongside a fewer parameters. Why is it so? Because theories alongside a larger number of parameters are either
  1. much less probable than the theory alongside a few parameters because most of the "new parameter space" spoils the predictions – because additional parameters receive got to live adjusted too it's unlikely that it's done right, or
  2. the theory alongside fewer parameters may live considered as a "subset" of to a greater extent than complex theories, thence if you lot written report the simpler theory inward this sense, you're non wasting your fourth dimension – most of your operate may live recycled ane time you lot bargain alongside the possible to a greater extent than complex theories (the whole epitome of effective patch theories is a broad subcategory of this phenomenon)
These arguments aren't "rigorously proven" to live right but if nosotros didn't exercise whatever "extra-empirical" guides at all, nosotros just couldn't mayhap brand a unmarried determination inward science, ever, because an arbitrarily incorrect theory may e'er live modified, engineered, too tuned to live formally compatible alongside the data.

His listing of the "preferred extra-empirical" criteria includes
simplicity, testability, falsifiability, naturalness, calculability, too diversity.
None of them genuinely tries to live equivalent to the validity of a theory, the probability that it's correct, which is why those aren't genuinely scientific criteria. But inward this list, the lastly entry, "diversity", must receive got shocked many readers just similar it has shocked me. What sort of diversity? Does he desire to prefer papers written past times dark or woman somebody or transsexual authors? ;-)
Or, a scientist may want to widen her vision of observable consequences of concordant theories inward club to cast a wider experimental net, which would atomic number 82 her to pursue various theories over elementary theories.
Well, the choice of pronouns indicates that he really wants to prefer theories past times woman somebody authors, fifty-fifty if he never makes this declaration explicitly. Well, I am certain you lot withal promise that he doesn't actually verbalize nearly the identity politics. Another judgement says the next nearly diversity:
No theory of theory preference volition live given here, except to say that “diversity” has a rigid claim to a character for preference.
It's rather difficult to figure out what he way past times the "diversity of a unmarried theory". We ordinarily empathize "diversity" as a holding of whole sets or groups (e.g. groups of people), non the private elements or members. But a few sentences later, nosotros read:
A few examples out of many inward the literature that receive got the character of multifariousness at to the lowest degree going for it are clockwork theories [19, 20] too theories of superlight night affair (see, e.g., [21, 22]). These theories atomic number 82 to novel experiments, or novel experimental analyses, that may non receive got been performed otherwise.
He just picks roughly – non genuinely terribly motivated – theories, clockwork theories too superlight night matter, too wants to prefer them because they receive got a "quality of diversity". The lastly judgement explains that past times "diversity", he way that the theory "leads" to novel experiments or novel analyses.

It's just nutty. Theories never "lead" to experiments. Experimenters may create upward one's hear to create an experiment but it's their practical decision that doesn't follow in whatever logical way from a theory. An experimenter needs roughly creativity, practical skills including roughly intuition for the economic scheme of roughly efforts, noesis of the established theory as good as proposed hypotheses to drib dead beyond them, too adept luck to successfully create upward one's hear which things are interesting to live tested or measured too how he tin regain something interesting or new.

There's no "straightforward" way to derive these experimenters' decisions from whatever theory past times itself. There's sure enough no "rigorous" way to practice thence – but you lot encounter the double standards. Other people's criteria receive got to live "rigorous", otherwise they demand to live thrown away. But his criteria may live totally non-rigorous. What the fudge?

So if an experimenter is inspired past times roughly theory, too the experiment may exclusively live justified past times a clockwork theory or a theory of superlight night matter, adept for him. But the experimenter isn't guaranteed to find the damn novel effect. And if the novel effect is exclusively predicted past times roughly very special theory, or ane theory amid hundreds, thence – miserable to say – it in all probability makes it less likely, non more likely, that the experiment volition atomic number 82 to roughly interesting results. Such a dependence of the novel effect on roughly very special theory is clearly an declaration (not an indisputable one, but withal an argument) against the experiment if the experimenter is rational.

Wells clearly wants to invalidate the self-evidently rational reasoning above. How does he invalidate it? If a theory C predicts something that no other theory predicts, this theory volition live declared "more important" because it passes a examine from "diversity". Holy crap. Even if he talks nearly roughly technical features of theories, their predictions, the logic of his reasoning is almost isomorphic to affirmative action, contrary racism, too contrary sexism, indeed. For all purposes, clockwork theories are transsexual Muslims too the superlight night affair is a woman somebody vegan who loves steaks. And that's why he wants to brand them to a greater extent than widespread. But from a rational viewpoint, what he calls "diversity" should live viewed as a negative trait, at to the lowest degree a negative recommendation for an experimenter.

His "extra preferences" are absolutely irrational from the viewpoint of the search for the truth too due to their similarity to the toxic left-wing identity politics, every decent physicist must forthwith vomit when he hears nearly Wells' proposals for "new criteria". If you lot neglect to vomit, you lot are in all probability non a adept physicist.

Sorry but as long as scientific discipline remains science, it is looking for the truth i.e. for theories that are to a greater extent than probable to live truthful or compatible alongside a trunk of observations. And this is e'er evaluated past times meritocratic criteria using justifiable probability distributions. Because the lastly theory of everything isn't known yet, these probability distributions too criteria aren't totally precise too rigorously defined. But they're parts of the required theorist's toolkit, they're existence tested past times the experiments as well, too their electrical flow shape as believed past times the best theorists are adept plenty – too adept scientists also pass roughly fourth dimension past times trying to improve too refine them. At whatever rate, they're vastly ameliorate than the pseudoscientific too borderline political novel criteria proposed past times Wells that receive got zero whatever to practice alongside the chances of the theories to live true.

And that's the memo.

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